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Introduction
Money can create jobs and thereby an income for individual households, but money is equally capable of  
destroying jobs and incomes. It is this dilemma, which should be at the heart of economic thinking.
The U.S and Europe have witnessed the destructive power of money ever since the end of 2006.
Individual households play the key role in this process. They are the ones who work in order to earn money,  
or are unemployed and do not have a chance to earn money. Individual households are the ones who are  
responsible for paying back their own debt: home mortgage debt, consumer durables debt and credit card  
debts. They -and they alone- are also responsible to pay back government debt.
Individual households are also the only households who can save in society- putting money aside out of  
incomes to be used for future consumption-. All accumulated savings belong to the individual households.  
They own it.
One would have thought that in civilised societies ownership would be respected. Regretfully when it comes 
to money, the rights to earn a living and the rights of ownership of savings seem to carry very little weight 
with governments, central banks, banks and international bureaucrats.  Together they all  decide what use 
should be made of the incomes and savings from individual households, often without even bothering to  
involve such households. It is not that they are not well intended, but results count and on that score the  
cooperation between these “money managers” has performed very poorly over the last six years.
What usually happens is that one group of managers’ blames the other groups. However such blame game  
does not solve the problems.
The crisis started with U.S banks lending -using households’ savings- in a manner which led to large loan  
losses on home mortgages. U.S investment banks multiplied the banking errors by selling these risks to fund  
providers around the world. The U.S and other investment banks also sold risk products -derivatives- which  
did not use funding of the underlying assets as an obligation, but could produce gains on other people’s 
losses. Individual households were not asked by the banks on whether they agreed to have the risks on their  
incomes  to  be  sold  on.  Individual  households  were  also  not  asked  by  the  investment  banks  whether  
packaging such risks and making them tradable on a daily basis was a sound decision, as their incomes 
would never be able to accommodate early repayment of their mortgages. The subsequent liquidity crisis in 
2008 spread the effects in the U.S from the 5.3 million of households who got into payment problems to all  
132 million U.S households and far beyond. American households lost $12.6 trillion from their savings in  
2008 alone and up till to-day have been unable to earn this loss back out of incomes.
The reaction of individual households was not to save less, but rather to save more as well as differently. For 
about 75% of savings in the U.S, the motives for savings are practically insensitive to interest rates. The 
common reaction was to reduce debt on homes; continue to save for future pensions; increase the level of 
short term deposits and reduce the risks on the company sector by moving to government bonds.
On top of this the Fed, together with the Bank of England, the ECB and the Bank of Japan all thought that  
more credit rather than less would solve the economic problems. In the process they lowered the incomes for 
individual households. Again individual households were not asked, but they continued to carry the payment  
risks for a rapidly increasing government debt at reduced income levels.
This paper provides an analysis and suggests a number of possible solutions. It deals with possible causes of 
a money crisis; it deals with income generation out of jobs and income generation out of savings. It deals  
with the current crisis and finalises with suggestions on bank reform,  on “quantitative strengthening” as  
opposed to QE and on “economic easing” as a method to give individual households temporary access to 
their own savings to help boost consumption levels. It starts and finishes with the power of the people -the  
individual households- over the power of money.
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1. Money Crises
A money  crisis  never  occurs  due  to  individual  households  putting  aside  money  to  be  used  for  future  
consumption. There is no way that savers can save too much. Savings -in theory- should help an economy 
grow more rapidly as the investments made with the help of such savings are supposed to make an economy  
more efficient.
Reality is different. Money crises can occur due to four different factors, of which three are linked with the  
management of banks, a central bank and a government. They are:
• A financial  crisis  can occur  as  a consequence of  a  commodity price  related cash transfer  from 
importing countries to commodity exporting countries. The oil crisis of 1973 was an example. The 
price setting of oil was and is manipulated by controlling oil output levels. Incomes were and are not 
spent in the local economy but transferred abroad. Also, in some extreme cases, a high dependency  
on imports, can lead to a currency crisis or a government bond liquidity crisis in case such bonds  
were issued in a foreign currency.
• A financial crisis can also occur as a result  of ill-advised lending and risk transfer policies. The  
banking sector has moved away from the traditional direct banker-client relationship and loans held 
to  maturity.  The  second  banking  phase  became  an  indirect  funder-client  relationship  in  which 
funders finance the loans, do not  know the clients and want instant  tradability for their  funding  
obligations. The final and most recent phase is that banks sell and buy risk products which do not  
require providing funding at all, but still place bets on the outcome of the risks’ taking processes.  
The shift away from direct client relationships has de-humanised banking. The objective of banking 
was to use money -savings- for the benefit of individual households. The pendulum has swung to 
using individual household monies for the benefit of bankers and other financial services providers. 
Banks can collectively cause a crisis by excessive levels of lending or risk taking practices on clients  
who cannot afford to pay back their commitments. The indirect funder-client relationship can cause 
liquidity crises if investors want to get out of their funding commitments in a short period of time. 
Individual households, who carry the responsibility for paying back both mortgage obligations as  
well  as  government  debt,  do  not  have  the  financial  resources  to  pay  back  such  commitments  
instantly. Corporate bonds represent a single company’s obligations and the company and its banks  
usually use clear cash flow projections, hence less chance for a liquidity crisis.
• A financial crisis can be enhanced by the actions of central banks. Central banks control two key 
elements  in  a  society:  Interest  rates  and money and financial  market  liquidity  with  the  aim of  
maintaining the  value of  a  currency -inflation  targeting-.  What  the  Fed,  the  ECB,  the Bank of  
England and the Bank of Japan are all doing is to create money in order to provide liquidity to their 
respective economies  -quantitative easing-.  The question is:  why is  such liquidity needed as the 
individual households in, for instance, the U.S have a net worth of more than four times GDP, four 
times US government debt and twenty seven times US Federal Government annual tax revenues 
according to the 3rd quarter data 2012 provided by the Fed.1 Could it be that financial markets have 
organised  themselves  in  such  a  manner  that  risk  trading  of  assets  rather  than  holding  debt  till  
maturity has become an objective in itself? 
• The financial crisis started in the U.S around October 2005 and especially from 2008 spread around 
the world. This crisis was not caused by the U.S government but by the U.S banking system. The  
causes of the current crisis had all to do with what banks did collectively. They caused the losses to  
individual households on house prices, to pension funds and mutual  funds’ assets; the latter two 
acting  as  fund  managers  on  behalf  of  individual  households.  However,  in  some  instances,  
governments, like the Greek one, did cause their own financial crisis by persistent excessive levels of 
borrowing rather than raising sufficient tax revenues.
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
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1.1 Banking crises
Collectively banks can lend to their clients -governments, companies and individual households- amounts  
which exceed the pay back capacity of such clients. It is important to emphasize the concept of collective 
responsibility.  Banks do not deal in products as defined by physical output products.  They deal in risks 
contained in money flows or even in money risks without underlying money flows. A banking crisis is rarely 
the responsibility of a single bank, notwithstanding how big such a bank is relative to the total financial  
sector in a country. Major banks in the world also operate in many countries. Cross-border risk taking is very  
common and not only restricted to banks. Pension funds, mutual funds and other elements of the money 
sector  buy risks  at  home  and  abroad.  However,  in  nearly  all  countries  the  banking  sector  acts  as  the 
originator and distributor of money risks. Banks also receive all their funding directly or indirectly from 
individual households: Directly through individual deposit taking activities and individuals as shareholders; 
indirectly through pension funds, mutual funds, companies and other intermediaries. 
It is very rare for lending risks to show up in the year that the risks are entered into. There is nearly always a  
time lag. It may be two years, three years or even longer before risks turn into doubtful debtors. The clear  
sign that excessive risks have been taken is when the money input- the savings amount- does not lead to a  
higher money output. It is natural that risk taking is accompanied by some loan losses, either on interest  
payments and/or on principal amounts. The collective risk taking process is an accumulator process.  More  
risk taking can lead to higher banking profits, but more risks can also lead to higher loan losses and lower  
banking profits. In the latter case the savers -individual households- see the return over their savings reduced  
due to the loan losses made. This effect can be multiplied through the securitisation process of mortgage 
debt,  corporate debt  and government  debt.  Corporate  bonds are  usually closely linked to  the cash flow 
forecasts for companies. Due to this close link such bonds are less likely to show a high level of defaults and  
in case of default usually the full amount of principal is not lost. 
For mortgage debt and government debt individual households carry the ultimate responsibility to repay both 
types of debt. In case of securitisation of such debt, which happens for nearly all government debt, individual 
households do not have the capability to significantly speed up repayments out of their current income levels. 
Investors may wish for daily liquidity, but such wishes may turn out to be illusionary. If governments try to  
reduce government deficits by increasing taxes, the only way in which individual households can respond is  
to reduce spending on goods and services. In the case of mortgage debt, not only does the individual capacity 
to repay such debt matter, but also the collective debt volume level and the characteristics of such debt. It is  
not just one bank which causes a mortgage lending crisis but the collective of banks. If a mortgage lending  
crisis occurs, the recovery process takes a long time as the real estate markets have to absorb the volume of  
repossessed  “second hand”  homes.  Not  only do  banks  incur  losses,  but  such  losses  are  also  spread  to 
individual households with drops in home values, in the values of mutual funds, pension funds and other 
savings  vehicles.  Government  expenditure  is  mainly  regulated  by  law,  which  makes  such  expenditure  
inflexible and leads to larger budget deficits when the level of tax receipts decline or grow less fast. Lower  
tax incomes are the result of society experiencing job -income- losses and loan and value -savings- losses.  
Finally the process is further complicated by risk management techniques applied through the derivatives 
markets, among others interest rate swaps and credit default swaps. The latter techniques make it possible to  
split funding from risk taking on the principal amount -credit default swaps- and to split the risks on interest 
rate movements -the returns over principal amounts- between various market participants. The latest banking 
activities involve taking risks without funding such risks: synthetic derivatives.  Individual households, in 
providing all savings to society, are the ultimate risk holders. It is their obligation to repay government and 
mortgage debt. Regretfully individual households collectively rarely play a role in the risk decision making 
processes.
1.2 Central Bank’s actions
No one in the U.S. will suggest that individual households can repay outstanding Federal debt in anything 
less than say 40 or 50 years unless one wants to wreck the economy.  Even an exact estimated period of  
repayment is difficult to provide. No U.S. government has committed itself to do so. However, why does an 
increased level of US government debt from $7.6 trillion per the end of 2004 till $16.37 trillion per end of 
November 2012 require such totally different interest rates?  The implied 10 year US government bond yield  
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per end 2004 stood at 4.2% and was 1.72% as per 30th December 2012. With a doubling of government debt 
over this period, the long term interest rates are now less than half as what they were per end of 2004.  
Incomes for individual households are reduced -but the reverse is true for risks- just when such incomes are  
needed most:  at  times  of economic  hardship.  Perhaps this  is  partly due to money creation (quantitative 
easing)  and furthermore  due to  a  shift  to  safety and a  lack of  viable  alternative real  sector  investment  
opportunities. What is clear is that in 2004 a positive yield of about 1.7% over inflation was maintained,  
while currently inflation and yield level are practically at the same level. The current practice by all major  
central banks to provide liquidity to the bond markets is not guided by proper bank supervision guidelines, 
but by allowing banks to offload mortgage and government risks to the central banks. The risks stay however 
with the individual households. 
1.3 Government debt crises
Governments can create a debt crisis if they, consistently, do not fund their own activities from tax incomes.
Greece is a case in point. However in many other countries the government debt crisis was not caused by the  
governments themselves but by falling tax incomes as a consequence of recessionary periods caused, for  
instance,  by either a commodity led crisis  or  a banking sector caused crisis.  In Spain,  for instance,  the 
government debt crisis originated within the banking system, not by securitisation like in the U.S, but by  
banks funding the construction of 800 000 homes for which there are no buyers. Governments usually rule 
by the book of laws. In the case of transfer payments between the private sector and the beneficiaries of  
government  laws  -the  unemployed,  the  retired  and  the  infirm-  it  is  worth  investigating  how  the  tax  
expenditure for these individuals and the taxes raised from the employed persons could be linked directly  
with one another. This avoids a major cause of borrowing.
2. Income generation: Jobs
In table 1 below the unemployment rates by age and gender are provided from 2006 till most recent date 2  for 
a number of selected countries:
 Table 1:   Unemployment rates by age and gender: 2006-2012 for selected countries.
      Year
Country
2006  
%           
2007
%
2008
%
2009
%
2010
%
2011
%
2012
Latest
Data %
USA 4.6 4.6 5.8 9.3 9.6 9.0 8.1
U.K 5.4 5.3 5.7 7.6 7.8 8.0 7.9
Germany 10.3 8.7 7.5 7.8 7.1 5.9 5.5
France 8.8 8.4 7.8 9.5 9.3 9.2 9.7
Greece 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.5 12.5 17.7 24.0
Italy 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.5 8.4 8.4 10.8
Spain 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 21.6 25.5
Portugal 7.7 8.1 7.7 9.6 10.8 12.7 15.8
2 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Unemployment_rate,_2000-
2011_(%25).png&filetimestamp=20120502100338
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From these statistics it  is clear that the economic crisis is far from over. Apart from Germany all  other  
countries show unemployment rates far above the 2006 levels. Whatever governments, central banks and the 
IMF have done, in one key area -unemployment levels-there can only be one conclusion: they have failed. If 
their economic analysis of the patients were wrong - current unemployment levels indicate that this is the 
case- than the medicine applied could well be the wrong medicine also. This is all the more striking if one  
focuses on youth unemployment rates over the same period and the same countries3.
                          Table 2:   Youth unemployment data for selected countries 2006-2012
                                                                      (15-24 years)
  Year
Country
 
2006
  %
2007
  %
2008
  %
2009
  %
2010
  %
2011
  %
2012
Latest %
U.S.A 10.5 10.5 12.8 17.6 18.4 17.3 16.4
U.K. 13.8 14.2 14.1 19.0 19.3 20.0 21.9
Germany 13.6 11.7 10.4 11.0 9.7 8.5 7.9
France 21.6 19.1 18.6 23.2 22.9 22.1 21.8
Greece 25.2 22.9 22.1 25.8 32.9 44.4 51.2
Italy 21.6 20.3 21.3 25.4 27.9 29.1 35.9
Spain 17.9 18.2 24.6 37.9 41.6 46.4 51.1
Portugal 16.2 16.6 16.4 20.0 22.3 30.1 36.1
These figures do not show the full picture of youth unemployment levels as many more are NEET’s: not in 
employment, education and training, but simultaneously not actively registered as job seekers.
Tables 1 and 2 clearly show that large sections of the labour force are unable to earn their own upkeep and 
thereby do not contribute to increasing demand levels in their respective economy and to the accumulated 
savings levels. The situation is made worse. Those in work need to pay higher taxes, both in the current  
period as well as in future. Governments justify such tax claims on laws, which of course their Parliaments  
have  promulgated.  Rather  than  drafting  laws  to  justify  spending,  governments  could  consider  to  link 
elements of the tax income with government expenditure levels.  Such an economic approach would balance 
tax income levels much more directly with government transfer payments. The legal approach increases the 
need for higher taxes on employed persons and reduces their disposable incomes. Such disposable income 
levels are the basis for potential borrowing levels for homes, durable consumer goods and for credit card  
spending levels as well as for servicing government debt levels.
3 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/Unemployment_statistics#Youth_unemployment_trends
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3. Income generation: Savings
Individual savings -net worth- levels are well recorded in the United States4 and in the United Kingdom5. In 
the U.S. such data are produced on a quarterly basis, in the U.K. on an annual basis. For other countries data  
are available but are more fragmented and not presented in a systematic manner like in the U.S. In the latter  
figures, government debt has been included on the assets side as U.S individual households directly and 
indirectly funds all government debt -apart from the overseas held element- but on the liabilities side the 
obligations have not been included. Such debt has to be met out of future incomes, but governments usually  
do not make it clear how much of the principal amount has to be paid back and over which period. Hence the  
interest amounts are included in the annual government budget figures, but repayment obligations are not.
3.1 Income generation: supply and demand of savings
The key mistake economists and central bankers can make is to regard money as a product and thereby treat  
money as if there is a supply and demand and a price level, which guides the money and financial markets to 
an equilibrium position. Nothing is further from the truth.
Consider some of the elements of savings: home mortgages and pension fund savings. Under a 30 year fixed 
rate mortgage agreement an individual household does not have the option to discontinue his/her mortgage 
payments, in case the current 30 year mortgage rate becomes substantially lower than the one the household 
may have agreed upon five or ten years ago. If mortgage payments were to be discontinued the home would  
be repossessed and all or nearly all savings locked into the home would be lost for the individual household. 
Households are  locked into their  mortgage agreement  and with it  the applicable mortgage interest  rate,  
notwithstanding what the prevailing interest rate of the day is. Only a very small proportion of individual  
households -the new entrants to the housing market- benefit from lower current mortgage rates. Variable  
mortgage rates expose individual households to interest rate movements and risks which will influence their 
disposable income levels once interest rates move up. Again individual households have no choice; they 
have to continue following such mortgage arrangements if they do not want to lose their home. The key 
factors determining demand for mortgages are the price levels of homes and the availability of jobs. The 
latter will determine the individual household’s disposable income level after tax. Employment, inflation and 
tax rates determine the disposable income levels and unemployment levels the number of households which 
might or might not be eligible for home mortgages. Inflation can be caused by a number of factors most of  
which are not related to interest rates. Tax rates do not depend on the prevailing interest rate level. The price 
level of houses may be strongly influenced by bankers’ errors as will be explained for the U.S.
Savings in homes - the amounts set aside to reduce the principal amount of the home loan outstanding- are  
insensitive to interest rate movements, once a fixed rate mortgage has been concluded. Savings on variable  
interest rates are subject to mortgage costs’ interest fluctuations. However it is not the amount of saving 
which changes when interest rates move up, but it changes the interest payment amounts.  With a variable  
interest rate mortgage, the effect of the combined amounts of interest and principal has a negative influence  
on disposable income levels. The latter levels do matter for economic growth levels. Less disposable income 
leads to lower levels of economic growth.
Interest rates also play no role in how much people save for their pension pot. Fixed amounts are set aside  
out of individual household’s incomes to save for a pension, irrespective of what the prevailing interest rate  
level is.
In the U.S the combined level of savings incorporated in homes and pension fund reserves is $21.8 trillion  
according to  the  most  recent  Fed figures.  Savings in  homes  and savings for  a  pension,  which together  
constitute 33.6% of total households’ savings input, are to a very large degree not guided by interest rate 
movements.  
4 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
5 http://www.econstats.com/uk/uk_bb_____80a.htm
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Another savings element is incorporated in corporate equities and equities in noncorporate business. For 
these  businesses  both  savings  values  together  add  up  to  another  $17.6  trillion  or  27.2% of  individual  
households’ net worth. The interests costs are a cost element of production, but usually only represent a  
small  percentage  of  total  costs,  the  other  costs  being  labour  costs  and  the  costs  of  raw  materials  and 
intermediate goods. The valuation of shares depends heavily on general demand levels rather than on interest 
rates. All in all savings in homes, for pensions and in equities, which together represent more than 60% of all  
savings, do not depend or only depend to a very minor degree on interest rate setting. If interest rates rise,  
companies  will  reward  shareholders  slightly less  and bank loans  slightly more.   However  the  ultimate  
beneficiaries of both cash flows are the individual households. 
The final element of households’ savings is in short term deposits. It represents $8.8 trillion or 13.5% of the 
total  net  worth  of  U.S.  households.  Evidence  from  the  net  worth  data  suggests  that  notwithstanding 
historically low interest rates these deposits keep increasing. Again proof that the reason for such savings is  
not to follow rewards -the interest rate-, but to set money aside for economic uncertain times. The conclusion 
is that approximately 75% of all individual households’ saving is not sensitive or have a very low correlation  
to interest rate movements -the price of money-.
The real role of interest rates is in setting the long term government borrowing rates. Low or negative yields  
affect pension funds and mutual funds and thereby indirectly companies involved in Defined Benefit pension 
schemes. Low or negative yields after inflation will also mean lower or negative income levels for individual  
households.
My conclusions out of the above are threefold:
1. Individual households do not save or dissave because interest rates move, but they save to protect their  
homes from being repossessed and they save to build up a pension pot. Even their short term savings are  
accumulated  not  because  of  the  prevailing  interest  rates  levels,  but  because  of  economic  uncertainties. 
Practically 75% of savings are made not because of the price -the reward for savings-, but because of other 
motives.
2. For most companies interest rate costs are only a minor cost factor. Aggregate demand levels are much 
more relevant than the actual level of interest rates. Currently large companies have build up huge cash 
reserves,  not  because  interest  rates  are  so  attractive,  but  because  the  outlook  for  demand  levels  is  so  
uncertain.
3.  Income levels of individual households do suffer when the users of savings, especially governments are 
unwilling to pay a positive return after inflation for their debt. Making savers poorer does not help to jack up  
income levels of individual households at a time that such income injection is all the more needed to help 
demand levels grow. 
4. The recent U.S financial crisis 
4.1 The start
In  October  2005 the  level  of  new housing  starts  was  2.01  million.  This  monthly  figure  represents  the 
seasonally adjusted annual level of new housing starts.  The number of owner occupied homes was 74.2 
million at the same time. A simple calculation shows that the new housing starts would replace the total  
stock of owner occupied homes in 37 years. If one takes the total housing stock number of 132.4 million  
units,  it  would take 66 years to replace all  housing stock. The American Association of Home Builders 
expects newly built homes to last over 100 years. No data were found which provided a precise assessment  
of the average lifespan of existing homes, but one may assume that this lifespan might well be over 80 years  
and going  up  with  every new home  build.  The  conclusion  to  be  drawn from this  fact  is  that  in  2005 
9
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individual households had the means to buy homes at a speed far greater than the population and replacement 
needs were at the time. 
If households had all financed such home purchases for 100% from their own savings, the economy would 
have gotten a boost from turning savings into current spending levels. Economic history tells another story. 
Not  only  were  most  home  acquisitions  bought  with  borrowed  funds,  they  were  bought  on  mortgage  
conditions  which  were  heavily  skewed  to  a  continued  rise  in  house  price  levels.  Such  “softening”  of 
mortgage conditions were clearly spelled out in a Deutsche Bank study6.  In the years 2005 and onwards 
“subprime” mortgages were sold on a grand scale, to the tune of $1.2 trillion out of a total mortgage market 
of approximately $10 trillion. What made these mortgages so risky is that 37% of them were interest only  
mortgages without any obligation to save and repay principal amounts; 38% of these mortgages were 100% 
mortgages  requiring no down payment;  in  43% of  the  mortgages  no income check was made  and self  
certification of incomes is not the best method of checking on the viability of granting a mortgage to an  
individual household and in 80% of the mortgages an “attractive” low interest rate was built in the mortgage  
proposal prevailing for a period of two years after which time a steep  hike in mortgage interest rate was 
applied. For all such mortgages the risks were shifted from an income related lending programme to an asset  
based one -the home values-. If house prices would drop, the borrowers would see their loan amount exceed 
the value of the home; if interest rates would increase, then after the two year period the steep hike in interest  
charges  would  become  even steeper,  leading  to  more  affordability  problems.  When  borrowers  get  into 
payment problems, they automatically become the lenders’ (or the holders of the debt titles) problems as 
well. The conclusion to be drawn from the funding process was that for an important share of the mortgage  
market, the financial market suppliers -banks mainly- were lending funds in which individual household’s 
income levels played a minor role and increasing house price levels the major role. This created an almighty 
speculative bubble which went wrong.
Evidence of the impending financial disaster could be traced back to the levels of foreclosures.7  
                 Table 3: Foreclosures, Foreclosure Filings and Home Repossessions 
       
Foreclosures Foreclosure Filings Home Repossessions
2012 Year Projection 2,300,000 2,100,000 700,000
2012 (Jan-Sept) 1,616,427 1,382,000 572,844
2011 3,920,418 3,580,000 1,147,000
2010 3,843,548 3,500,000 1,125,000
2009 3,457,643 2,920,000 945,000
2008 3,019,482 2,350,000 679,000
2007 2,203,295 1,260,000 489,000
2006 1,215,304 545,000 268,532
2005 801,563 530,000  
2004 640,000   
2003 660,000   
2002 700,000   
2001 540,000   
2000 470,000   
6 http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_gbp/gbp_gssf08_022_031_db_us_subprm.pdf
7 http://www.statisticbrain.com/home-foreclosure-statistics/
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The rise in foreclosures did not start in 2008, but already in 2005 when they jumped by some 25% over  
2004. In 2006 they jumped by another 52% and in 2007 by still another 81.3%.  All this exemplifies the case 
that mortgage lending in the period up to 2008 did not show the usual characteristics of a relatively stable  
level of foreclosures. The financial crisis started around October 2005 when new housing starts reached its  
peak, the level of foreclosures started to accelerate and simultaneously the 30 year fixed mortgage rate was  
increased from 5.77% till 6.36%.
It has already been pointed out in the above that the banking sector collectively created the home mortgage 
products and the home mortgage lending boom in the U.S. Some banks and mortgage originators were more  
aggressive than others but what matters is the volume of lending which is determined by the collective of  
banks.
The following table illustrates the growth in home mortgage lending figures for the U.S. for the period 2000 
to 2012 (Source: Fed: B100 Balance Sheet of Households) as well as the growth in home values.
          
                  Table 4: Increase or decrease in home mortgage lending levels 
                                  And in household home values levels 2000-2012
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 3rd
qtr
Mortgage
Lending
level
+/-
$billion
384 507 705 884 942 1039 983 675 - 52 -145 -302 -230 -275
Home
Values 
Change
+/-
$billion
1552 1374 1283 1631 2500 3090 682 -1870 -3316 -407 -577 -512 912
If the commercial banks had continued to fund the mortgage loans themselves, the crisis would have 
affected  them  most.  However  in  the  U.S,  after  the  last  depression  of  the  1930’s,  the  government  
established firstly Fannie Mae and subsequently Freddy Mac, both government sponsored enterprises.  
Their role it is to support individual households in funding their home acquisitions. The problem with  
Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac’s funding strategy appeared in October 2008, when both entities had to be  
rescued by the Federal Government.  Reason for this was that Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac not only  
arranged the funding of home mortgages, but simultaneously took over the payment  -credit- risks on 
individual households. If the latter risks had stayed with the banks, which could and should judge such  
payment risks, than neither Fannie Mae nor Freddy Mac would have experienced cash flow problems, 
provided the banks had given a bank guarantee for their clients’ mortgage payment risks. It would also 
have slowed down the banking sector’s ability to take on such payment risks on their own books.
Another major element in the risk transfer process was the securitisation of home mortgage portfolios.  
American  investment  banks  started  in  2005  and  later  years  to  sell  Collateralised  (Mortgage)  Debt  
Obligations (CDO’s) to domestic and foreign investors. Again this represented a risk transfer process of 
risks, which were partly poorly judged by the commercial banks -the subprime mortgages-. Helped by 
the judgment of U.S credit rating  agencies to give such CDO’s a AAA rating, such CDO’s were sold  
around the world, but also to U.S. money market funds. Savers around the world -including via their 
banks, mutual funds and pension funds- invested in these securities. The final nail in the coffin came from 
CDS’s,  the synthetic CDO’s,  which no longer required the funding levels of  CDO’s,  but represent a 
11
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leveraged bet  on the outcome of the mortgage market  securities values.  Such bets  could easily earn  
money out of declining home values. Banks could through their propriety trading activities take large bets  
and at the same time by not disclosing their own direction of bets, induce their clients to take opposite  
bets. Such banking activities encouraged market participants to trade in risks without the need to provide 
funding for the underlying assets.
What securitisation does to debt is to make it tradable on a daily basis. Rather than providing funds for the  
duration of the mortgage loan or a government debt facility and stay with the credit risks until maturity,  
banks have introduced the option to buy and sell risks on a daily basis. It is this conversion from funding till  
a loan matures, to funding which can be withdrawn on a daily basis, to risk taking on the underlying asset 
without even to have to come up with the funds for funding the asset, which really has changed the character  
of banking.
Individual households were never asked for their approval for these practices. However they were and still  
are  very  much  affected  by  these  changes.  In  the  old  banking  world,  banks  used  to  act  much  more  
conservatively. They, through their credit vetting procedures, tried to ensure that their clients could repay 
their mortgage bills and let their clients take part of the risks themselves. Banks would also continue to hold 
onto the loans till maturity. They knew their clients. Securitisation of debt titles changed all that. The funders  
have  no  links  with  the  clients  any longer.  They can  not  get  involved in  workout  situations  which  old 
fashioned  bankers  would  get  involved  in,  if  temporary  payment  difficulties  occurred  for  an  individual 
household. The only redress these “remote funders” have is to go after the asset values -the homes- rather  
than conclude deals with individual households. Old fashioned banks would have written off some of the  
debt,  but would value their customers if the customers would show willingness to pay back as much as  
he/she could. Selling of the home would be the last resort.
On August 9, 2007 the French bank BNP Paribas told investors that they would not be able to take money 
out of two of its hedge funds because it could not value the assets in them due to a “complete evaporation of 
liquidity”.  Securitisation brings  with it  the  chance of  a  complete  evaporation of  liquidity.  This  is  what  
happened in the CDO markets from August 2007. This is what aggravated the mortgage lending crisis. No 
longer  where  individual  households’  incomes  regarded  as  the  potential  source  of  repayment  -  the  old 
fashioned banker’s style-, but their assets -the homes- were regarded as the source of repayment. The CDS  
holders were also only interested in claiming their gains and other investors’ losses as soon as possible. The 
run on the U.S housing market was on. Tables 3 and 4 provide the evidence. 
No bank can survive a run on its deposit base; neither can a securitised bond market survive a concerted sales 
drive if all market participants run for the exit. A liquidity crisis can occur and did occur in 2008 as interbank  
lending practically dried up. Banks did not know which risks other banks were carrying and neither did the 
regulators.  Banks  stopped  interbank  lending,  which  for  some  banks,  like  Northern  Rock  in  the  U.K. 
amounted to about 75% of its funding base. Northern Rock was subsequently nationalised.
Regulators, banks and the investing institutions could all have realised that the real risks for mortgage bonds 
were not only in the payment performance of individual households, but also in the market liquidity levels of  
the bonds as well. The CDS’s invention did not help either. Individual households were never asked whether 
they agreed with these market practices. They however suffered the consequences.
4.2 The effects
4.2.1 The income and savings effects
The U.S home mortgage crisis started around October 2005.
The  effects  have  been  and are  still  being  felt  around  the  world.  All  these  effects  matter  to  individual 
households.
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Firstly the income effects in for instance the U.S. Take the year 2010. The unemployment rate was 9.6%,  
while in 2006 it stood at 4.6%; an increase of 5% of the labour force over this period. The labour force was 
154 900 000 in 2010 and the average wage was $41 675 per individual employed. The income effect for 
2010 for the extra 5% of 154 900 000 equals 7 750 000; multiply the latter number times the average wage 
and the direct loss -due to the increased unemployment rate- to the US economy comes to  approximately 
$323 billion. Compare this to U.S. GDP in 2010 of $14.582 trillion and the direct negative growth impact 
was 2.2% of GDP. 2010 has only been used as an example to calculate the impact of higher unemployment  
rates on demand levels. For each year that unemployment rates were and are higher than 4.6%, a similar  
calculation can be made. The negative impact of job losses on GDP continues up till to-day in the U.S and in  
all other countries where unemployment levels have gone up.
The second effect was and is on the value of savings for individual households. In 2008, American individual 
households lost slightly more than 19% of their total savings net worth in a single year: a loss of $12.6 
trillion. They lost 22.8% on their home values in the period 2006 - 2008 and 29.4% over the whole period 
2006-2011. Only some recovery started in 2012. Individual households lost 40.2 % over their corporate  
equities holdings in 2008 compared to 2007 and 17.3% over their equity in noncorporate business over the 
same years. The flight to safety was clearly marked by the shift to deposits.  In 2007 they grew with 13.9% 
and in 2008 with a further 8.1%. There was also a very strong shift from equities to U.S government bonds 
as witnessed by the changes in the 10 year yield. In July 2007 the yield was 5% and by January 2009 the  
yield had dropped to 2.5% 
Another  important  element  can  be  deduced  from the  U.S  Balance  Sheet  of  Households  regarding  the 
country’s asset/liability mix. If a household borrows funds, it is of course on the understanding that the value  
created with the borrowed amount is at least equal or more than the borrowed amount, especially when an  
individual  household borrows for acquiring a home. If new homes last,  say,  for 100 years,  a maximum  
depreciation amount per annum would be 1%. What happened in 2006 and 2007 should have been a severe 
warning about the impending economic disaster. As shown in table 4, in 2006 house values went up by $682  
billion and home mortgages by $983 billion. The new loan money exceeded the home value increase by  
$300 billion.  In 2007 the picture became much worse: home mortgages up by $675 billion and home values 
down by $1.87 trillion, a savings loss of $2.545 trillion. The economic efficiency of the use of savings went 
down very rapidly. More (borrowed) money was translated into lower values of money. A great loss!
The American individual households learned quickly that new home borrowings led to lower home values,  
so there was little incentive to continue borrowing more. From the peak of $10.55 trillion in home mortgages 
in 2007 they changed tack and started to repay their mortgages till as per the end of the 3 rd quarter 2012 for a 
total  amount  of  $1.061 trillion or  about  10% of  the  original  borrowing level  of  2007.  Such change in  
households’ economic behaviour has, of course, effects on economic growth levels.  If one assumes that  
about $500 billion annually in additional home mortgages is a sustainable level and if individual households 
would not have paid back about $200 billion per annum, than the combined $700 billion would have brought  
about a positive growth effect of 4.4% of 2012 GDP which stood at $15.8 trillion. As it happened, the extra  
borrowings did not take place and individual households repaid their mortgages to the tune of $200 billion 
per annum since 2007. In other words in paying back outstanding mortgage levels and by not borrowing 
more the US economy was 4.4% worse off per annum than before the banking crisis. Less borrowing and 
actively reducing outstanding debt levels will mean lower spending levels. Demand levels are reduced.
A main conclusion out of the above is that economists, bankers, central bankers and government officials did 
not understand the dangers of excessive lending levels. The subprime mortgage level may “only” have been 
$1.2 trillion, but the savings losses for U.S individual households as a consequence of misguided banking 
activities were $12.6 trillion in 2008 alone. This amount does not include the subsequent government deficit  
losses (see 4.2.3). The $12.6 trillion also does not take into account the losses made by individual households  
in other countries around the world. The power of money left the people powerless. Individual households  
paid the price.
13
                                                                                                                                         People’s Power: The Power of Money © Drs Kees de Koning
4.2.2 The price effects on U.S homes.
In  October  2005 the  level  of  new housing  starts  was  2.01  million.  This  monthly  figure  represents  the 
seasonally adjusted annual level of new housing starts.  The number of owner occupied homes was 74.2 
million at the same time. A simple calculation shows that the new housing starts would replace the total  
stock of owner occupied homes in 37 years and the total housing stock in 66 years.
In January 2009 new housing starts dropped to 490 000. The replacement ratio of new building versus owner  
occupied housing stock dropped to 167 years and to the total housing stock to 274 years. Of course neither of 
these figures showed a stable housing market. They are excesses.
As explained in the above, the reason for these excesses can be found in the way savings were used. If, in  
2005,  aspiring new home owners would only have used their  own savings rather  than have used other  
people’s savings by borrowing (part)  of  the acquisition price,  the effect  would probably have been less  
demand for new homes, as fewer households would have been able to complete such purchases. However no 
default on home loans would and could have occurred. The extensive use of credit on the wrong credit risk 
conditions was able to entice many more households to get a foot on the property ladder. The entry risk price 
was lowered so that 2.01 million new households could get a foot on the property ladder. Demand for homes  
soared, not because individuals had the funds to buy their homes, but because lenders had lowered the entry  
risk price by extending credit  on non-sustainable levels.  The increase in foreclosure levels in 2005,  but 
especially in 2006 and 2007 showed that entry risk price was set at too low a level. 
If one assumes that the current average lifetime of a U.S home is 80 years, the stable number of houses  
which could be build on an annual level would be somewhere around 1.6 million per annum.
Table 3 shows that from 2006 till and including 2012 5.35 million second hand homes were brought back on 
the U.S. housing market. Such sales have had four major effects: 
(1) They force house prices down, because the original home loans were no longer repaid out of the incomes 
of the 5.35 million individual home owners, but by liquidating the assets - the homes-. They were seized and 
brought back to the housing market to create an additional supply factor of 5.35 million homes over and 
above new housing starts. 
(2) Second hand homes are all homes built in the past, which is when their construction had an impact on  
economic activity.  Second hand home sales reduce the incentive to build new homes. This has a current  
effect on economic activity. 
(3)  When  the  financial  markets  move  from an  income  related  to  an  asset  related  recovery strategy on  
doubtful debtors -especially when such debtors are individual households-, the effect spreads from the 5.35 
million  individual  households  to  all  households  through the house  price  effects.  All  home  owners  lose 
money, not just the 5.35 million households affected.
(4)  As  mentioned  earlier,  American  individual  households  quickly  noticed  that  additional  mortgage 
borrowing was the wrong personal  strategy in times  of declining home values.  They started paying  off 
mortgages to the tune of about $200 billion annually.  This effect combined with the fact that  mortgage 
lending did not grow any longer had a negative effect on economic growth of about 4.4% per annum.
The risk price negotiated by banks when the mortgage period started for the 5.35 million home owners was 
clearly too low for the risks encountered. The house price drop from $22.7 trillion per end of 2006 till $16.0  
trillion per end of 2011 represented a 29.4% in value loss on all 134.2 million homes in the U.S over this  
period. All home owners suffered, notwithstanding that “only” 5.35 million home owners defaulted on their  
home loans. Every single home lost on average $50,000 from the original 2006 average value of $169,150. 
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The money effect of lending the wrong volume of home loans at the wrong conditions turned the positive 
power of money into a negative one not just for those who could not afford to service their loans anymore  
but for all home owners. The securitisation of home mortgages amplified this effect. 
Another conclusion one can draw is that the market price for homes reflects not only the demand for homes, 
but more importantly also the (ab)use of savings. It is therefore an incorrect market price, one based on 
wrongful risk assessments on the income levels of some 5.35 million individual households.
4.2.3 The income effect on the U.S. Government
The U.S Government publishes a Citizen’s guide to the Financial Report of the United States Government on  
an annual basis8, the latest one is for the fiscal year 2011. If one combines these data with the ones published 
by the White House9,  the period 2002 till  2007 produced an average government deficit of $279 billion 
annually. From 2008 till and including 2012 the average annual deficit increased to $1.158 trillion, about  
$880 billion more per annum than in the period 2002-2007. The additional loss to individual households -  
increase in debt level over and above the $279 billion annually from 2002-2007- was a combined $4.4  
trillion over the last five years. Not all of this incremental debt can be attributed to the housing market and  
subsequent banking crisis,  but certainly the greatest part of it can. Unemployment  levels doubled in this 
period, real economic growth levels dropped from 3.2% in 2006 till -2.6% in 2009 and is currently at 2.1% 
over 2012, which is well below its long term average. The current U.S government debt level is well over 
$16 trillion and stands at about 102% of GDP, but also at 6.7 times the tax income of $2.4 trillion over 2012.
If households would have been able to continue mortgage borrowing to the extent of $500 billion per annum 
and not repay $200 billion in mortgage debt and if the unemployment level would have stayed at 4.6% than 
the positive growth impact of these two factors alone would be around 6.6% of GDP, but probably more if  
one  adds  in  multiplier  effects.  Not  only would  tax  incomes  have  increased  due  to  the  higher  level  of 
economic activity, but government expenditure levels would have been less on social security costs. As it  
stands individual  households have an extra $4.4 trillion debt to service and pay this debt back out  of  a 
reduced level of collective incomes and savings. For this reason alone, the shorter the adjustment period, the 
better it is for the individual households.
5. Possible adjustment measures
5.1 A Loss Prevention Strategy
Probably a good way to start analysing in which way the U.S economy could be stimulated is to consider the  
role that individual households can play in this process.
In  the  suggestions  for  possible  actions  a  clear  distinction  will  be  made  between  annual  incomes  for  
individual  households:  the money amounts  gained by working for a living and the gains or losses over 
accumulated assets held by them on the one hand and the managerial actions taken by governments, central  
banks,  the  banking  system and  other  financial  services  providers  plus  the  actions  of  the  IMF and  the 
European Union bureaucrats to handle such money related asset volumes on the other hand.
One very important aspect, which individual households have never requested, is the switch made by banks  
and other financial market intermediaries to move from income based lending practices - practices which  
rely on future cash flows of individual households- to asset based lending -the values incorporated in homes 
and government bonds in particular. Banks and governments have made it an objective to make risks and  
claims tradable and thereby transferable. If individual households would have had a choice over this matter,  
en masse they would have refused to give permission for such a change in view of the disastrous effects  
which it has had on their individual net worth.
8 http://www.gao.gov/financial/fy2011/11guide.pdf
9 http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals
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Individual households do not have the tools which companies have to stem losses over their income and over 
their savings. They cannot dismiss themselves as they need a job and thereby an income to survive; they also  
cannot, on an individual basis, eliminate the losses over their savings caused by the actions of one or more of 
the money managers: a government, a central bank, banks and other financial intermediaries.
Individual  households also do not  have legal  rights to protect  themselves  from economic failures.  They 
cannot sue the banking system for collective failures. They cannot sue a government over the right to have a 
job and an income, but in reverse a government can sue an individual household if the household does not 
pay its taxes on time. Individual households cannot sue a central bank over causing an income loss over their  
government bond holdings, held by themselves and/or by their financial representatives: the pension funds 
and the mutual funds.
All  rights  individual  households  have  in  relation  to  jobs,  incomes  and  savings  are  economic  rights.  If  
individuals contribute to output, such output will grow as companies will only employ them if such output  
brings profits to these companies. Such jobs create incomes as well an improved return over their savings. If  
individual households do not contribute to output due to economic system failures, output,  incomes and 
returns on savings are lost and those out of work depend for their survival on other households still in work.  
The right to work is the most fundamental economic right of all.
The second main economic right is to see to it that savings -the action of postponing consumption till a future 
date- is duly rewarded. Individual households need to save for some very basic needs: for a home as a roof 
over their heads and for a private pension to ensure that they individually can take care of their own future  
income levels rather than having to rely on the solidarity of others. They also need to take care that they can  
afford the claims made by the government over their incomes and savings for government debt servicing. 
From an economic perspective it does not make sense to save and subsequently see the value of the savings 
reduced to less than the original amount saved.
However this is exactly what happened in 2008 when individual households lost $12.6 trillion. As per the  
end of the third quarter 2012 the net worth of individual households is still $1.2 trillion below the 2007 level, 
notwithstanding  all  the  incomes  generated  from  2008  till  currently.  This  amount  excludes  the 
aforementioned extra loss of $4.4 trillion in additional government debt created as a consequence of the 2008  
financial crisis.
The losses and “profits” or gains to individual households are clear for everyone to see in the Balance Sheet  
of Households as published by the Fed on a quarterly basis. The size of losses and gains are nowhere else to  
be found in economic and financial statistics. Economic growth data do not deal with home values, share 
values, the values of pension funds and mutual funds, and the use of funds in a constructive or destructive 
manner. They also do not show separately the inflation and income effects of quantitative easing practices.  
Even the economic loss in having larger numbers of people unemployed is not quantified very often.
What needs to be considered is the use made of savings. In the Citizen’s Guide to the Financial Report to the 
U.S. Government of 2011, the Government has $2.7 trillion in assets and $17.5 trillion in liabilities. Of the 
$2.7 trillion only $ 850 billion are property, plant and equipment and the remainder financial claims which  
include holdings of mortgage backed securities. The physical and financial assets will produce some income, 
but  on  the  whole  government  borrowings  have  been  used  as  consumption  expenditure  rather  than  as 
investment  capital.  Therefore the use of savings by a government for stimulating consumption levels -a 
Keynesian  solution-  is  less  effective  than  alternative solutions.  Public  works  do create  assets,  but  their  
income return over these assets usually stretch out over very long periods of time; cost controls are usually 
less strict than in private sector activities, due to all kind of political considerations and finally there is no  
clear  profit  objective  or  competition  to  compare  with.  Transferring  more  money  to  the  social  security 
beneficiaries also does not solve the problems as this is a pure consumption exercise, to be paid for by those  
still in work. Creating more posts in the civil service is also not a solution, if those jobs could have been 
carried out by the existing ones. At times when governments already need to borrow extensively, adding 
more debt on to the shoulders of individual households does not seem a particularly bright idea.
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One has to conclude that companies are under far more pressure than governments to use savings efficiently 
and  effectively.  Companies  have  to  turn  savings  into  earnings  in  a  much  shorter  time  period  than 
governments.  Competition,  private  shareholders  and  the  profit  motive  are  the  main  reasons  for  such  
behaviour. The potential financial gains for individual households are greater if their savings are used by the 
company sector, rather than by a government. What companies cannot do is to set the demand levels by 
individual households.
When a  home  mortgage  crisis  occurs  due  to  both  “reckless”  lending  practices  and a  liquidity crisis  in 
securitised mortgage bonds, the first economic effect which appears is a loss to the value of savings, the  
second one is a loss in incomes through lower new construction levels, the third one is a loss in jobs and in  
general demand levels, the fourth one is a shift of savings to government bonds and away from the corporate 
sector and the fifth one is  an individual  household’ loss through rapidly increasing government  deficits  
funded by government borrowings.
A financial crisis causes all the money movements -the movements in incomes and savings- to move in the 
wrong  direction.  Money rather  people  determines  the  fate  of  an  economy.  The  money  managers  have 
collectively lost their grip on such money movements. Individual households suffer as do pension funds and  
mutual funds, companies and a government. Even banks are forced to retract as their customers own lower  
savings levels as well as having less secure incomes.
When Keynes formulated his policies, private pension funds did not exist and certainly did not have any 
financial muscle as they do nowadays. 
Currently the combined pension fund assets in the U.S are over $14 trillion, which nearly equals GDP levels.  
These assets belong to individual households. A recent study (July 2012) made by Senator Harkin and his  
Committee10 (US Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor and Pensions) concluded that the retirement 
income deficit was $6.6 trillion and that half of all Americans have savings of less than $10 000. Such deficit  
is only partially caused by savers adding too small a part of their income to the accumulated savings, but is 
equally caused by the investment losses made as a consequence of the 2008 financial crisis. For instance in  
2008 pension funds lost 23.3% of their values (a loss of $2.9trillion) in a single year, notwithstanding the  
contributions made.
The sale of 5.35 million “second hand” homes kept the pressure up on households’ losses; the lack of job 
opportunities did the same; the lack of sufficient demand levels made companies hoard cash and restrict  
growth:  another loss to society;  the  U.S.  government  needs to balance its  books,  but  tax increases  will 
increase  the  loss  of  disposable  incomes.  Only the  growth  in  the  numbers  of  people  employed  and the 
increase in wages and salaries will counteract such losses. 
The conclusion is: the shorter the adjustment period can be kept, the better it is for all households concerned.
In order to do so a loss prevention strategy could be formulated. Such strategy could be based on five pillars:
1. The first pillar is: Economic Growth. Economic growth -the demand side for goods and services- can be 
encouraged if individual households could be given temporary access to some of their savings: Economic 
easing. Savings in homes and in companies cannot be converted into cash by all individual households at the 
same time. It would harm their home and company values. Pension funds constitute a major savings element 
for individual households. Pension funds receive interest and dividends -income- in a current year, but nearly  
in all cases a substantial share of such income is converted into financial assets. Economic easing is the 
action to temporarily postpone the conversion action and hand such income back to the pension savers in 
order to stimulate demand, create jobs and incomes, and improve company profits and lower government  
deficits.
10 http://www.harkin.senate.gov/documents/pdf/5011b69191eb4.pdf
17
                                                                                                                                         People’s Power: The Power of Money © Drs Kees de Koning
2.  The second pillar  is:  A Sound Banking Sector.  As  explained  in  the  above  the  current  losses  to  the 
individual households have been caused by poor risk management decisions by the banking sector on some 
individual  households  in  home mortgage  lending.  On top of  this  the  securitisation of  mortgage  debt  to 
funders -including pension funds and mutual funds- have turned long term debt into short term assets and in 
the process have created job losses, home value losses, share price losses and government losses through  
increased debt levels. Suggestions on how the banking sector could be reformed are included in this article.
3. The third pillar: Maintenance of a Positive Income over Government Debt. The creation of slightly more  
government debt to increase current incomes via a higher reward over government debt titles helps to shift  
the balance back from creating financial assets -government debt obligations- to increased income levels 
over savings when incomes  are  needed to stimulate  demand.  Such a  policy can be called:  Quantitative  
strengthening (QS).
4. The fourth pillar is: Matching Incoming and Outgoing Government Cash Flows. To avoid the need to have 
more  government  debt  created  by  social  security  payments,  a  system  of  “pay-as-you-go”  could  be 
introduced,  whereby  specific  contributions  of  individual  households  are  used  for  a  specific  type  of  
government expenditure: social security payments. 
5. The fifth pillar is: National Accounting. The losses and gains made in an economy are not reflected in  
economic growth data. The latter measure output, but not the monetary gains or losses made in the process of 
creating such output. Country Profit data should be taken as the lead indicator of economic health. They 
reflect the annual (or quarterly) increase or decrease in the net worth of individual households. They reflect  
the use made of the available savings. They link the monetary sector with the real sector. The U.S already  
produces such data, but they are not used for guiding the actions of the money managers.
This  package  of  possible  economic  measures  is  aimed  at  creating  the  jobs  needed  and  empowering  
households to turn the tide in using savings to the benefit of households rather than as a destructive power. It  
is also aimed at shortening the adjustment periods after a financial crisis has occurred.
5.2 Banking Reforms
Prevention is the better than a cure. This applies especially to the U.S and other worldwide banking sectors.  
If one sets oneself the aim to move the banking and financial sector away from liquidating assets and move 
back to rely on individual households’ incomes as the source of their repayments, a number of steps may 
need to be taken.
Banks in their banking activities can create gains or losses. Losses can be caused by misjudging their client’s  
abilities to repay loans out of future cash flows; they can be caused by transforming long term loans into  
short term financial assets and they can be caused by banks speculating via the derivatives markets on the  
outcome of the financial processes at work. The latter result depends on the outcome of the first two causes 
of losses, so the earlier two causes will be dealt with below.
 5.2.1 Risk accounting methods need to be changed. 
Once banks agree on, for instance, a mortgage for an individual household, they enter into a risk contract  
with their client: a risk taken on the future income levels of their client. Only in exceptional circumstances 
will the fall back position be the liquidation of the asset: the home. Banks multiply such risks by entering 
into many risk contracts for this one product line: mortgages. Banks know that a small percentage of these 
risks will not be honoured through repayments. The tax and accounting treatment needs to change in order to  
reflect such risks from the moment they are entered into till the moment of full repayment. 
First of all the tax treatment: The U.S and other governments need to accept that the contagion effect of  
losses on a small number of doubtful debtors should not be spread to all home owners. In the U.S over the 
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last  five  years  5.35  million  households  were  affected  out  of  total  132.4  million  homes  owned.  Such  
contagion prevention can be achieved by allowing banks to deduct risk provisions from their taxable income, 
not when the risks become doubtful, but from the moment such risks are entered into. By building up such 
payment  risk  reserves,  the  incentive  is  for  banks  to  settle  outstanding  claims  with  their  clients  in  an 
economically sensible way, by allowing a higher degree of flexibility in payment settlements. Only in truly 
exceptional circumstances should the threat of repossession be used.
Collectively the mortgage interest rates charged to all clients need to reflect the risk of non-payment by some  
households.  The tax authorities could also stipulate that when actual loan losses are made, such loan losses  
can only be met out of payment risk reserves. If banks do not make adequate provisions, the excess level of  
loan losses would no longer be tax deductible. Such a method will incentivise banks to make conservative 
estimates  of future  doubtful  debts.  It  will  also incentivise  banks to  take a conservative approach to the 
mortgage  products  they  sell  as  the  more  conservative  banks  gain  a  competitive  advantage  -lower  risk  
provisions needed- over their competitors.
Secondly the accounting treatment: Banks in all countries deal in money, not in physical products. Banks 
take or should take on risks on future cash flows, be they from individual households, small and medium 
sized companies, large corporates or governments. Repayment of all these debt titles needs to be made out of 
future  cash  flows.  Companies  need  sales  turnover  in  order  to  pay  back  loans.  Debt  of  an  individual 
household needs to be settled out of a household’s income as does government debt. What this all means in  
accounting terms is that the focus of bank accounting is or should be on income generation. Such bank  
income generation is created out of the difference in the price paid for the monies attracted and the price  
received for the monies lend. It is an income based approach rather than an asset based approach. The focus  
by  the  world  wide  bank  regulators  on  bank  capital  and  new  capital  requirements  misses  this  point 
completely. They focus on the assets rather than on the incomes. If bank risks are properly managed, banks 
do not need a penny of capital. Their income flows plus above mentioned risk provisioning technique will  
eliminate the need for capital. What banks need to do is to turn equity capital into perpetual notes by giving  
these note holders a fixed income per annum for an unlimited duration. Such perpetual notes could be listed 
and traded, but should not be redeemed by the bank in question. If banks make proper risk provisions and 
pay  their  “long  term”  fund  providers  a  decent  risk  premium,  bank  balance  sheets  would  reflect  the  
effectiveness of bank managements to manage risks properly. In case of under provision of risks the value of 
the perpetual notes would be written down and banks may need to attract more perpetual notes’ monies.  
Central banks may wish to appoint external auditors specialised in risk accounting which report back to the  
bank but simultaneously to the central bank. Costs to be borne by the bank involved. Finally bonuses paid to 
management will come out of profitability levels of banks, which resemble true risk accounting methods.
Thirdly the client treatment: Individual households are not well served if they are treated as objects rather 
than as humans. Banks should be forced into accepting that when they want to sell a mortgage or another risk 
to other banks or to the financial markets, they should have the client’s approval. In a sale to other banks not  
only the mortgage loan should be moved, but also the client’s cash flow out of salaries and wages. In this 
way incomes and risks remain related and so can the risk provisioning method. If a sale to the financial  
markets  takes  place,  the  payment  risks  should stay with the  bank concerned and the  funding  risks  are  
transferred. In such cases, banks obtain the funding from sources other than their own depositors, but provide  
a bank guarantee to these financial market fund providers for the payment risks.
Fourthly Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac involvement: The strength of both Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac is 
that their obligations are ultimately guaranteed not by the U.S government but by all individual households 
together.  Their  weakness  is  that  their  risk  taking  skills  are  not  based  on  a  continuous  assessment  of  
households’ abilities to service their debts. They have no direct link with the clients’ cash flows. For this 
reason their competitive advantage is in the funding process of long term fixed rate mortgages, without 
taking on the payment risks on the individual households. The U.S is in a fortunate position to have these  
two institutions. For commercial banks there is always the matter of liquidity when short term funds are 
converted into long term lending. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac have no such problem. They can raise long 
term funds easily with the backing of all individual households together. Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac were  
not set up to make profits out of a maturity mismatch, which is commonplace to commercial banks. Fannie 
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Mae and Freddy Mac could receive bank guarantees from the risk originating banks for the credit risks on  
individual households. In the recent dispute settlement for the amount of $20 billion some US banks have 
accepted that what they did in creating the home mortgage crisis did cause harm to Fannie and Freddy fund  
providers and to some directly involved individual households.
Fifthly: Investment banks: Investment banks also deal in risks. Such risks originate from equity and bond 
fund raising exercises for companies; for merger and acquisitions between companies and for stock market  
introductions. What went wrong in the U.S. is that such banks sold individual household’ risks to investors  
not based on their own client-bank relationship, but just as an intermediary. If above banking reform system 
is followed, the role of investment banks will be restricted to raising funds only and not selling any payment  
or credit risks on individual households. For their remainder tasks, including raising funds for governments,  
they also need to build risk reserves for all their client related activities, just like retail banks. As investment  
banks do not  have a  wide spread of clients,  their  provisioning should reflect  the  concentration of their  
counterparties and make higher provision levels. In the set up as suggested above, there is no need to split up  
investment banks from retail banks as long as all investment banking products including derivatives trading  
to companies and governments are seen as risk activities, requiring proper provisioning.
5.3 Possible Central Bank actions: QS
Individual  households  have no say over the setting of interest  rates for  longer  term government  bonds.  
However if one would ask them which type of government bond they would like the most, their most likely 
reply would be to have inflation related indexed linked government bonds. These are the same bonds which 
nearly completely constitute the pension reserves of the pension fund of the Bank of England. 11 In the U.K 
such bonds have done outstandingly well from an income point of view and so has the pension fund of the  
Bank of England. For pension funds, such rewards are essential in ensuring that pension reserves are in line 
with index linked pay-outs.
However  what  individual  households  -and their  representative  financial  organisations  as  pension  funds, 
mutual  funds  and  banks-  are  currently  faced  with  is  that  inflation  levels  outstrip  10  year  and  shorter  
government bond yield levels. This is the case for the U.S., the U.K., and for Germany and other Northern  
European countries. Japan has a slightly positive yield margin over inflation. Just like in the case of the  
banking sector and mortgage bonds, there are parallels with government bonds. Government bonds represent  
an income flow and a financial asset for the holders of such bonds. Governments enter into a risk contract  
with their individual households and their financial representatives. Government debt will in due course have  
to be repaid by the individual households collectively. Such risk contract may not be a written one, but every 
cent and penny borrowed cannot be repaid by the government itself, but has to be done by the individual  
households -an economic and financial necessity-. It certainly would be a repeat of the Weimar Republic if  
central banks had the aim of money printing in order to eliminate all government debt. Money would become 
worthless.
By buying up bonds through quantitative easing exercises, central banks do not reduce the risks to individual 
households but they do change the price of the bonds; the inflation level with the money created -which is  
not  based  on  true  savings-  and  the  individual  household’s  income  level  over  the  total  outstanding 
government debt level. In the U.K for instance the Bank of England has bought up £375 billion out of a total 
government debt level of slightly over £1 trillion. By the Bank’s own admission it has increased inflation  
levels by about  1%. The current  10 year  gilt  yield  is  1.84% and the current  inflation level  is  2.70%, a 
negative 86 bp carry. Index linked gilts represent about 20% of the total gilt market.
Banks and pension funds are forced by the regulators to value their government bond portfolios at a mark-to-
market price. Central bank’s bond purchases add a substantial element of price fixing to supply and demand, 
which is very much like the behaviour of oil exporters. It reflects supply management to the free markets and  
11 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/humanresources/pensionupdate.pdf
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thereby undermines the true market  price for government bonds. It becomes a regulated price, a useless 
instrument for measuring true levels of supply and demand for such bonds. 
Secondly the bond buying practice increases the so-called market value of existing bonds leading to profit  
levels which are unreal, as they are the effect of central bank’s actions. An article in the U.K Daily Telegraph 
of 31st December 2012 assesses that “the real winners of the QE programmes have been the hedge fund 
managers and that those relying on interest income have suffered; especially the savers and pensioners.”
The stated aim of QE programmes  is  to bring interest  rates down for borrowers,  be they companies or  
individual households. In my view the emphasis is on the wrong side of the equation. As explained in the  
above, in the U.S situation, about 75% of individual households’ net worth does not follow the price for 
money:  the  interest  rate.  In  the  case  of  home  mortgages  individual  households  are  actually  reducing 
borrowing levels. Even short term savings can be regarded as interest rate insensitive as is evidenced in the  
Balance Sheet of Households, which shows that savings levels increased when interest rates dropped. Large 
companies  are acting in a similar  manner  as individual  households;  they are hoarding cash or repaying  
obligations.  Banks do not  benefit  either  as  they try to  repair  their  balance  sheets  and  are  not  keen on 
increasing exposure when demand levels in the economy remain sluggish. QE programmes are based on 
supply driven factors rather than being based on incomes earned in a society. It is the latter factor which will  
accommodate increased lending levels.
What QE programmes should have done - which is not unnatural when U.S government debt has risen from 
$7.6 trillion at the end of 2004 till $16.37 trillion per end November 2012- is at least to maintain the positive 
margin  over  inflation  which  in  2004  was  1.7%  for  10  year  government’  bonds.  The  reason  that  U.S 
government bonds are still attractive to financial markets is that they offer an escape route for savings from 
other financial asset classes, not withstanding the interest rate levels. This is based on the expected ability of  
individual households in the U.S to keep up in paying interest amounts and to keep up the payments in future  
over some principal amounts. It is based on the net worth of individual households and their future cash  
flows and rightly so.
If the aim of QE programmes would have been to maintain the positive 1.7% margin, the Bureau of Public 
Debt in co-operation with the Fed could have issued government bonds, not to fund government deficits, but 
to support the income generation of pension funds, mutual funds and of individual households.  Such a move  
would have reduced or eliminated the need for companies to pledge additional resources to support their DB  
pension schemes and companies would have been left with more resources to invest. The costs? If one takes 
the Citizen’s Guide to the 2011 Financial Report of the United States, the government debt outstanding to the 
public was $10.2 trillion. The interest paid was 7% of $3.7 trillion (2011 government expenditure level) 
which equals $259 billion. The latter amount equals an average interest rate over outstanding debt of 2.54%. 
As the inflation level was 2.4% average over the year till September 2011, the additional costs would have 
been 1.56% over $10.2 trillion equals $159 billion.  By combining an increase in the percentage of inflation 
linked bonds, longer maturities, higher volumes of debt with higher debt prices, the resulting payment of 
$159 billion could have been achieved. The charges could be transferred to the government budget as and  
when the U.S government needs additional financing. It is basically a pre-financing operation, but with the 
aim to increase the payments over outstanding debt from $259 billion till $418 billion annually creating an  
increase in incomes of 1.1% of GDP.
Such programme approach could be called QS which stands for Quantitative Strengthening. It is an income  
based approach rather than an asset based swap from the private sector to the public sector which reduces 
current households’ incomes over an increased risk level.
5.4 Jobs and demand levels to support economic growth: Economic Easing
No economist is in doubt that higher aggregate demand levels would create more jobs. If such jobs are not  
dependent on transfer payments from one group of individual households to another, from broadly speaking 
the private sector to the public sector, than the incomes of those jobs created will truly support additional  
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consumption and savings. Such incomes and savings will also make it possible to extend more credit to the  
individual households, which will accelerate the economic progress, provided such credit extension can be  
met out of future households’ incomes. 
The study of the balance sheet of U.S households allows one to come to the following conclusions:
The institutionalisation of savings in pension funds, in homes and in equities in corporate and noncorporate  
businesses, which in 2006 constituted 68.7% of all U.S savings assets, means that initiating moves between 
savings and current consumption is severely hampered. Individual households own the savings, but cannot  
make use of them. On top of this the incomes out of government debt have been severely reduced, in part  
due to Quantitative Easing exercises undertaken by central banks and in part due to the shift in savings away 
from risk related economic activities to the least risky investment category -government bonds-.
Taking risks on economic activities is the only way an economy can create the jobs needed and support a  
reduction in government deficits. In order to achieve such a goal, demand levels have to grow faster. The  
only real option of converting some savings into current consumption cannot be found in selling homes to  
free up income and not in selling shares or liquidating companies, but only in using pension reserves as the 
temporary source of an asset conversion into current cash -economic easing. 
Such use of savings does not create debt as all pension savers together own the pension funds’ assets. One 
measures the currently needed pension fund reserves by discounting the future liabilities over the group of  
individuals covered by the pension agreement and taking into account their life expectancy. The beauty of  
economic  easing  is  not  that  the  pension  liabilities  change,  but  that  the  asset  values  underpinning  such 
liabilities will change as a cash bonus paid out in say 2013 and perhaps 2014 will change the level of demand 
in an economy and with it the job opportunities, share prices and if central banks apply the QS method also  
the returns over government debt. An expected increased value of pension assets changes the discount rate, 
the net present value of future obligations. 
Of course economic easing is a risk strategy, which pension funds may be reluctant to enter into, unless all 
other pension funds act in the same way and unless there is a backstop which will cover their “investment in  
their members”. However economic easing is based on sound economic principles if all individual pension 
funds and their members cooperate. The main aim is to reduce the unemployment levels from the current  
8.1% till 4.6% by increasing demand levels in the U.S. economy. The main tool is to give pension savers and  
beneficiaries temporary access to a small part of their pension savings: “a Pension Dividend”. The main 
backstop is that all pension funds receive a government guarantee -backed up by all individual households- 
that if such risk strategy only partially fulfils its objectives, the remainder obligation will be paid up by a  
government on basis as if the funds were borrowed on a 10 year government bond maturity. However the 
increase in the value of the assets as a result of economic easing should be set off against the government 
guarantee. In my background paper to the Tenth Annual Conference on Pensions, Retirement Security and 
Strategies for Investment Conference organised by Harvard Law School (March 28-30 2012), I suggested to 
use “economic easing” as a method to stimulate economic growth.
Economic easing can be defined as the action of turning a small part of the income out of the pension savings  
into current consumption, not by the pension fund itself but by the owners of the savings: the individual  
households.
Take the U.S. case as an example. If 2% of pension savings were distributed in 2013, this would mean that 
$280  billion  extra  consumer  demand  would  be  created,  provided  all  beneficiaries  spend  their  pension 
dividend on consumer goods, something they could be encouraged to do by President Obama. This would 
represent a consumption driven boost of 1.85% of GDP in 2013. If, assuming again, that markets know that 
such action would be repeated in later years until economic growth reaches its optimal growth path, than  
such certainty will make companies wanting to invest their cash reserves or obtain additional bank or capital  
markets funding. Jobs will be created. Production levels will be increased. Company profits will increase, 
hence share prices will improve. Country profit levels will start to improve. Finally the government will  
benefit from higher tax incomes. The positive multiplier effect will start to work.
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If one would ask individual households if they would agree with such a course of economic action, I am sure 
that nearly all would welcome the economic stimulus process by using their own savings. The objections are  
all likely to come from the “money managers”, who do not own the savings; both governments and pension  
and asset managers.
The practical implications for implementing an economic easing policy are as follows:
- Step 1: The Government aims to reach an agreement with all pension funds (DB as well as DC schemes) so 
that the latter can pay say 2% of their value to all pension savers and retirees. The values could be fixed as of  
30th December 2012.
- Step 2: Once an in principle agreement has been reached, such pay out (a pension dividend) could be made  
available in four equal quarterly instalments of 0.5% of the value, starting as soon as administrative hurdles 
have been overcome.
- Step 3: The pay out could be for an equal amount per pension saver and retiree. This would benefit the  
younger and the less well off more than those closer to retirement date and those with the larger pension 
pots. However the younger participants have the longest period of contributions and investment risks ahead 
of them.
- Step 4: As the aim of this measure is to stimulate economic growth; the government might agree to have 
the pension dividend paid out tax free.
- Step 5: If pension funds are short of cash, they could be allowed to borrow these amounts from the Central 
Bank in their respective country, until pension contributions and dividend and interest flows have come in.
- Step 6: As a logical extension of economic easing, which is done to create more Country Profit for all 
households,  a  government  could  agree  that  the  pension  savings  used  for  current  consumption  will  be  
guaranteed by the taxpayers if the value increases in other assets created through economic easing show a 
shortfall.
- Step 7: The logical conclusion could be that such shortfall guarantee is assessed as and when economic  
growth rates have reached the desired level, in other words when Country Profit levels have reached their  
long term average and unemployment levels are reduced to 4.6% in the U.S
- Step 8: The rewards for pension funds in participating in such a scheme could be a taxpayer’s shortfall  
guarantee, based on inflation based remuneration per annum for the pension funds. The indirect rewards for  
pension funds are more substantial as the increased level of demand in the company sector will be translated  
in higher share prices. Banks will experience less loan losses. The government will also benefit indirectly by 
higher tax incomes. The maturity of the economic easing facility should be determined by the pension funds 
and the government jointly based on actual country profit developments.
- Step 9: As the repayment obligation is not linked with the repayment of past government expenditure, 
economic easing does not influence government debt levels. It is in effect a scheme to bring forward the use  
of a small part of the savings and have such savings replaced by increases in asset values as and when  
Country Profit levels start to rise and if such there is a shortfall than the government’s guarantee will kick in.
- Step 10: Finally the beneficiaries of the pension dividend should be convinced that the amounts are for 
consumption purposes rather than for adding to the savings level. This needs political commitments at the  
highest level.
The economic easing method can be started up and stopped very easily. It can also be maintained for longer 
than a year, if needed. Both groups of taxpayers and pension pot savers and retirees are U.S. citizens. A 
potential positive side effect of economic easing is that it will stimulate individual households to participate  
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in funded pension scheme savings as only pension savers and retirees will receive the pension dividend. Such 
participation will reduce the pressure on future government’s budgets to provide for the basic state pension.
Economic easing can be implemented in the U.S and other countries with a substantial  funded pension 
system. In the cases of Spain and Italy, for instance, these countries have not built up such pension reserves 
and may need some help from other Eurozone countries.
5.5 Government action on transfer payments
A type of action, which governments can take, is to make social security payments dependable on the “pay-
as-you-go” system. In Germany, for instance, state pension beneficiaries can only receive whatever comes in  
specified tax charges on all employed individuals. If the number of employed contributors decreases and 
their contribution volume thereby also decreases, than the consequence is that with a delay of one month,  
also the payout to state pension beneficiaries decreases. This principle could be applied to unemployment  
benefits, sickness benefits, housing benefits and any further benefits that individual households receive from 
those in work. For housing benefits, such system needs to be included in the rental contracts government  
entities conclude with home owners.
One argument often used in defending pay-outs on basis of needs, rather than on incoming cash-flows, is that  
the  economy is  better  off  -an  economic  stabiliser-  if  such pay-outs  continue notwithstanding  lower  tax 
receipts. However if governments need to borrow more, it means that individual households will have to pay 
back larger amounts later. The so-called stabiliser effect turns into a destabilising effect later, not a very good 
economic principle.  More government  debt  also means  that  in future  households have a  lower level  of  
disposable income, which limits the individual’s ability to use the credit extension method to a society’s  
advantage.
6 Conclusions
Individual households own all the savings in a society. Their opinion is rarely sought on matters which affect  
the use and the returns on such savings, let alone getting their consent. Financial crises can occur and for  
crises induced by the “money managers” there are options to overcome such crises. This can be done through 
reorganising  the  banking  sector  as  well  through  economic  easing  and  quantitative  strengthening.  Once 
companies have the confidence that market demand levels will pick up due to individual households having a 
higher disposable income level, they will start to invest and the multiplier effect of investments, job creation, 
lower banking risks and lower government debt levels will turn the negative power of money into a positive 
territory again. 
What is most important is to shorten the period of economic upheavals. Liquidation of assets lengthens this 
period. Income boosts: if not out of increasing employment levels, than by using savings and convert a small  
part of such savings into increased consumption levels will do the trick.
Such income generation needs the help of pension funds and the individual households. It also needs the help 
of government. Together the people’s power can overcome the power of money.
Drs Kees de Koning
10th January 2013
Chorleywood, U.K.
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